I explore the effect of a bank's failure on its client firms using the 1998 bankruptcy of a middle-sized Estonian bank.
Introduction
The bank-firm relationship, like any other lender-borrower relationship, involves asymmetry of information. This imperfection of the market allows firms to reap the cost advantage from long-term relationships with banks (Diamond (1991) ). Hence it is natural to expect that the failure of a bank should affect its client firms' future performance due to the breakdown of the favored-credit channel.
Several studies, based on bank crashes in the U.S., Japan, and Korea (Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) , Gibson (1995) , Kang and Stulz (2000) , Yamori and Murakami (1999) , Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002) ) confirm this prediction and imply that the bank-firm relationship has an economic value. Furthermore, this effect apparently differs across countries according to the availability of equity financing. In particular, Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2003) do not find any effects of the banking crisis in Norwegian 1988-91 on firms' equity value. The authors explain this departure from the results typical for Japan or Korea by the fact that Norway firms were using relatively more public equity financing.
To-date there has been no empirical evaluation of the effect of bank failure on client firm performance in the context of a transition economy. This is surprising because the specific nature of transition economies makes this issue particularly important.
First, bank failures are common in transition economies (Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) , (2002)). Second, the majority of firms in transition countries are relatively young and lack reputation. Diamond (1991) suggests that such firms are more likely to depend on borrowing from banks as opposed to direct borrowing (issuing bonds or commercial papers). The stock markets are young as well and their level of activity is low (Grosfeld and Roland (1995) ). Bank borrowing is therefore the main external financing channel in transition economies (Cornelli, Portes, and Schaffer (1996) ).
1 Further, empirical evidence from Korea (Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002) ) implies that the failure of a bank has comparatively more severe effects on those firms that rely mainly on banks for their financing.
In this paper, I fill the gap in the literature by quantifying the value of the bankclient relationship in a transition economy -Estonia. Estonia is an important case to study for several reasons. First, it has had a currency board system since 1992 and therefore monetary policy has not been used to respond to money market difficulties.
Estonia is also one of the most economically free countries in the world.
2 Therefore this liberal policy has exposed Estonian firms to all international shocks. Second, Estonia had a banking crisis at the beginning of its transition period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) 3 and suffered another banking crisis in 1998. This study considers the latter crisis.
Estonia had twelve banks at the beginning of 1998 but only six at the end of the year. Eesti Maapank (The Land Bank of Estonia) was the first to disappear. 4 It lost 1 Calvo and Coricelli (1993) suggest that at least 20 % of output collapse in early transition was explained by contraction in credit. its license in June 1998 because of permanent insolvency. 5 At the beginning of 1998, the bank was ranked the seventh largest based on total assets and covered 4% of the market. The first part of my sample consists of 119 firms which were clients of the Land Bank of Estonia.
These firms are not listed on the Estonian Stock Exchange. Hence, in contrast to earlier studies on bank failure effect on client firms, I am not able to quantify the effect on firms' equity values. This also means that the firms in my sample do not rely on public equity financing; bank loans are the main external source of finance.
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To measure performance I rely on information in the firms' balance sheets and income statements. To analyse the potential effect of bank failure on firm performance I use a comparison group of 114 randomly selected Estonian firms. Even though I do not have any information about the bank-specific lending relationship for my comparison group firms, I assume that the probability that they were clients of some other bankrupt bank is marginally small. 7 The data cover the years 1996-2000.
5 The shareholders tried to recapitalize the bank in April 1998 but failed. The main reasons for insolvency were the mismanagement of loans' and securities' portfolio. The potential bad loan portfolio of the bank should be considered with caution because the direction of causality between the bank bankruptcy and firm bankruptcy is not clear. I address this issue in the analyses by controlling for the pre-bank bankruptcy financial characteristics of firms.
6 34% of firm financing came from internal resources in 1998 in Estonia. Domestic bank loans constituted 29% of total external financing of Estonian firms. Together with loans from the foreign sector the share of resources from banking is 51% (Kangur, Rajasalu, and Randveer (1999) ) compared to 66% in Japan and 39% in US (Gibson (1995) ).
The unique data set allows to the following questions to be answered: Is the bankruptcy of the bank followed by bankruptcies of its client firms? Do firm performance measures deteriorate after their bank's bankruptcy compared to other firms?
I answer "yes" to the first and "no" to the second question. Hence, while I detect a higher rate of bankruptcies among the failed bank clients I do not find a deterioration in the financial variables.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review theoretical and empirical studies of bank-firm relationship. In this section I also spell out my testable hypothesis. The data and methodology section follows. Section 4 presents the results.
I conclude and discuss the policy implications in section 5.
The bank-firm relationship reviewed and testable predictions
The theoretical foundations of the benefits of the bank-firm relationship are pointed out by Diamond (1984) . He stresses that financial intermediaries with a diversified asset portfolio are in better position to monitor borrowers and therefore are better off in overcoming the issue of asymmetric information. Diamond (1991) finds that firms which have long credit records -older firms with a long relationship with a bank -are exposed to cheaper borrowing. Those firms may find it also more beneficial to turn to the financial market directly -so their financing decisions are less dependent on bank credit. The firm choice between borrowing from a financial intermediary or directly from the market is considered also in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . They show that only large firms can borrow directly from the market. Intermediate size firms borrow from banks and the smallest firms do not have any access to outside financing. The explicit inference of this is that large firms are more flexible in their borrowing decisions and they should find it easier to switch from one financier to another.
There is now extensive empirical literature evaluating the bank-firm relationship. Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) Yamori and Murakami (1999) execute a similar study for the Japanese Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank in 1997. In addition they were able to answer the question whether the closeness of the relation with the failed bank had an effect on the firm, since in Japan firms report annually the banks they use in order of significance. Yamori and Murakami identify large negative abnormal returns to firms having a tighter relationship with the failed bank on the day of the bank failure and the day after. More generally the whole banking sector crash in Norway in 1988-91 with its influence to the firms is considered by Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2003) . Surprisingly they find that firms' equity value slightly increased at the time of the crisis. Although banks were the major source of external financing in Norway, the banking distress did not damage the investment abilities of the firms. One of the explanations of the contrasting results compared to previous studies is that Norwegian firms were issuing on average new equity more often.
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Another branch of the empirical literature detects what type of firms are more affected by a banking crises and whether we can identify a real effect (i.e. decrease in investment). Gibson (1995) finds that a firm's investment depends on its main bank's credit rating. The clients of lower rated banks invested less during the time of weakness of the banking sector in Japan in 1991-92. Beside looking at the bank characteristics Kang and Stulz (2000) show that a firm's performance during the banking crisis depends also on a firm characteristics like its financing structure. Firms that use mainly bank loans for financing investments invested less during the contraction of the Japanese banking industry at the beginning of the 1990's. Also the stock performance of more bank dependent firms is worse at the time of a banking crisis. Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002) find support for the previous hypothesis in the case of Korea in 1997-98.
In addition they find that the financially weaker firms (e.g. less profitable) are more affected by the health of the banking sector.
The studies mentioned in the previous paragraph are more directly connected to my research agenda in that they do not concentrate narrowly on changes in stock prices and they deal with longer-term effects. In my study I consider the effect of bank failure on firm bankruptcy probability, and dependence on banks, leverage, liquidity, profitability, investments and efficiency. Based on theory and empirical studies I pose the following hypotheses: the bankruptcy of the bank increases the bankruptcy probability of the client firms, decreases client firms' dependence on banks, leverage, liquidity, profitability, and investments. The direction of the effect on efficiency measures is not certain.
In Table 1 , I summarize the testable predictions and the definitions of the financial ratios I use.
Data and methodology
The present analysis is focused on a bank bankruptcy, which occurred in June 1998 in Table 2 gives summary statistics for the firms in my sample in 1997, the start of my sample frame. The age structure of the firms in both groups is fairly similar. The average age is a little more than six years. The share of exporting firms is higher in the control group, where 53% of firms were involved in exporting their products versus 43% in the treatment group. The average profit and size are higher for the treatment group but the differences between groups are not statistically significant. In Section 4
I explore more deeply the differences between the financial ratios of the two groups of firms.
A first look at the data reveals significant firm attrition. The number of firms decreases during the sample frame due to firm bankruptcies. This model allows me to focus on the timing (year) of the exit, which is important for detecting the lag between the bank failure and firm failure.
The next step is to analyse firms' performance (see Table 1 ) based on the information in their financial statements. I visualize the variables across the treatment and control group and execute the differences of means analysis to detect the possible different performance across the two groups of firms over time.
Finally, I use panel data estimation to detect support for the "treatment effect" on the firms' profitability, fixed assets growth rate, liquidity and leverage after conditioning on other time changing covariates and correcting for attrition bias. The decrease in my sample caused by firms' bankruptcies means that the sample is truncated based on the dependent variable, which biases least-squares coefficients. I address this problem by using the Symmetrically Trimmed Leased Squares estimation method (STLS) (Chay 10 Ohlson (1980) was one of the first users of the logit analysis in the context of firm bankruptcy prediction.
11 The binary dependent variable "Survival" has a value of 1 if the firm is still in my sample in the year 2000 and 0 if, by 2000, the firm was bankrupt or in the bankruptcy process.
12 For details see Shumway (2001) .
and Powell (2001)). As I have already mentioned the observed values of the dependent variables are truncated and therefore the dependent variables have an asymmetric distribution. STLS restores symmetry by trimming the data from above, which allows one to estimate least-squares. The standard errors are bootstraped: based on 100 replications of the data the model is re-estimated revealing the variations of the coefficients.
The estimated regression is of the following form:
where i=1 to 233 is the firm index and t=1 to 5 is the year index. Y is either profitability, growth of fixed assets, liquidity, or leverage. lnsale is the logarithm of net sales (proxy for size) and credit is the total bank credit to assets ratio (proxy for bank dependence). ε it is the symmetrically distributed error term. D is the year dummy, T is the treatment group dummy and D * T is the interaction term between treatment and year dummies. The interaction term is calculated for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 to capture the potentially different behavior of the treatment group after the bank crash. All specifications except the profitability regression include the profitability variable as an additional explanatory variable. Profitability and liquidity regressions include the leverage ratio as an extra explanatory variable. 13 All regressions include industry dummies.
13 It is found in the empirical studies of corporate leverage (Titman and Wessel 1988) , investment (Kang and Stulz 2000) and liquidity (Kim, Mauer, and Sherman 1998) that the firm profitability is a significant explanatory variable as well as leverage being a significant explanatory variable for profitability (Joh 2003) and liquidity (Kim, Mauer, and Sherman 1998) .
Results

Firm survival
In this section I first estimate the probability of a firm surviving till the end of my sample frame. I ask whether the chances of survival are different for the failed bank clients compared to other firms. 14 I estimate the logit model and control for the treatment dummy, a constant term, a set of industry indicators, and I also condition on 1997 firm-specific performance information. The results are presented in column
(1) of Table 3 .
The 1997 profitability variable (return on assets) has the expected positive sign.
A 1% increase in the profitability ratio causes survival to increase by 0.14%; 15 the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level. The leverage ratio has a negative estimate suggesting that more leveraged firms are more likely to disappear, but it is not precisely estimated.
The logarithm of sales is included in the regression in order to control for the size of the firm. 16 The coefficient of this variable has a negative sign, suggesting that small firms are more likely to survive. This is a somewhat puzzling result because usually small firms are considered more likely to go bankrupt (Ohlson 1980) .
17
14 I exclude the 15 firms for which I do not know the reason of exit.
15 All the marginal effects in logit and later in hazard estimation are calculated at the means of the independent variables.
16 Results are robust to using logarithm of total assets instead proxy of firm size.
17 The negative coefficient in front of the logarithm of the sale variable might be accounted for the restructuring of the large Soviet-time firms (see also footnote 18 for more details). To allow the I also test for the effect of firm age. Column (1) in Table 3 (2001)).
The treatment dummy has a significant negative effect on survival. The treatment firms are 17% more likely to go bankrupt compared to the control firms. This result means either that treatment firms are weaker firms than firms in the control group (but this weakness is not accounted for by the 1997 financial characteristics) or that the bank bankruptcy has had a negative effect on the treatment firms. Therefore it is important to understand the identifying variation of the significant 1997 profitability variable.
The lower profitability among treatment group firms would raise the possibility of reverse causality. A weak loan portfolio might have been the cause of the bank failure.
distinction of the effect of bank bankruptcy across the size of the client firms I added to the unreported specification the interaction term between the treatment dummy and logarithm of the firm sales into the logit and hazard estimations. I find that the bankruptcy of the bank does not have a different effect across the size of the client firms.
18 In unreported specification I also test (1) whether the large firms established during the Soviet time were more likely to be the ones which collapse after the bank bankruptcy (note that in my data I do not observe the renaming and the reorganization of the firms); (2) whether the firms with and without credit behave differently and (3) whether the exporting firms are more likely to go bankrupt after 1998. None of those hypotheses were supported by data.
Investigating the profitability of firms across the two groups reveals that the variation comes from both groups and therefore it should capture initial differences in the quality of firms. The profit from normal operations which I use for calculating the profitability measure takes into account the interest expenses and therefore the low profitability measure might not be considered as a signal that the firm is not able to pay back the loan.
Another argument against the reverse causality story is provided by the Bank of
Estonia's Banks Inspection report. In this report the Banks Inspectorate evaluated
Maapank's last balance sheet. On the assets side an additional 12 million kroons were added for the provision of credits. At the same time shares and bonds were written off to the amount of 286.6 million kroons. This is direct evidence that the decline in the stock market at the end of 1997 was the main cause of the bank's loss of liquidity and not the inability of client firms to pay back their loans. The share of non-performing assets of Maapank were 2.3% in May 1998, which is only slightly higher than the Estonia banking sector average of 1% but still tiny compared to the other transition countries.
19 Therefore I conclude that the causality runs from bank failure to firm failure.
To shed some light on the issue of bank failure as a trigger of firm failure, it is important to test when exactly the exit of the firms occurred. If treatment firms go bankrupt shortly after bank failure, this would help to support the hypothesis that the bank bankruptcy causes the client firm bankruptcy. I estimate a discrete-time logit-19 Most of the transition countries have two-digit non-performing loans figures see EBRD "Transition specification duration model where duration corresponds to years of firm presence in my sample. Duration models build upon the concept of a hazard function, which is defined as the probability of leaving a given state at a specific duration conditional upon staying there up to that point. Such a simple duration model boils down to a logit estimation using each year of firm presence in the data as one observation.
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In the duration analysis, each observation corresponds to a firms' submission of an end-of-year financial report to the Center of Register. 21 The dependent variable has a value of 0 if a firm still exists in the next (year) period and equals 1 if a given firm exits the sample in the next period. 22 I control for the differences in initial financial characteristics of firms by including the 1997 firm-specific data into my duration model.
I also include year dummies (to absorb the economy-wide effects), and the interaction terms of treatment and year dummies. The last regressors are of interest since they detect whether the exit hazard for treatment firms is higher in some particular year after bank crash.
The results are reported in column (2) of Table 3 . Initial firm profitability is negatively related to going bankrupt in the next period. Firms with high profit ratio are less likely to disappear but this coefficient is insignificant. More leveraged, large 20 I do not consider unobservable heterogeneity in the duration model (Heckman and Singer 1984) due to the small amount of data available. 
Firm performance
A simple visualization of the effect of bank bankruptcy on firms is provided in Figures   1-5 , where the medians of main financial ratios are graphed over time separately the for treatment and control group of firms.
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The variables in the first group measure firm dependence on bank credits. The ratios in this group are short-term bank credit to total bank credit, total bank credit to total liabilities and total bank credit to total assets. The first ratio expresses the credit structure: the importance of the short-term credit. The other two ratios might be considered substitutes as both of them express the overall importance of credit in firm capital structure.
The second group of ratios involves the leverage measure; how much a firm relies on external finance. I calculate the leverage as total liabilities to total assets. This ratio may have value above one since several firms in several years in my sample have negative total owners' equity. In Figure 1 I plot the three bank dependence figures and leverage ratio. The importance of bank credit, short term credit and leverage have slightly decreased over time.
The third group of ratios are liquidity ratios. I use three liquidity measures. First is the current assets minus inventories to total assets, second is the current ratio, calculated as current assets to current liabilities and third is the quick ratio, calculated as cash to current liabilities. In Figure 2 we can see that all the different liquidity measures are fairly stable over time but different across the treatment and control group of firms.
The fourth group of ratios are the profitability ratios. I look at 3 ratios -profit from normal operations to year average total assets, profit from normal operations to year average share capital and profit from normal operations to sales. I do not consider the ratio profit to equity due to the already mentioned negative equity problem. If both profit and equity are negative then the ratio will have a positive sign disturbing the distribution of the ratio since it is not possible to identify the reason why the ratio has a positive sign. From Figure 3 we can see that the profitability of the firms decreased until 1999, and in 2000 we can observe a recovery.
The fifth group of ratios are the growth ratios. I consider growth of total assets, inventories, fixed assets (as a rough proxy for investment) and sales. The sixth group of ratios represents the so called activity or efficiency ratios. I consider two ratios here. First, the inventory turnover ratio, which is calculated as sales to average inventories. Second, the average collection period, which is calculated as average receivables to sales times 365 days. This measures lag between the sales date and payments received date. From Figure 5 we can see that the behavior of measures have been different across the two groups. 26 The inventory turnover increased for the treatment firms while it decreased for the control firms. In other words treatment firms have gained efficiency while control firms have lost it. The lost of efficiency of control firms is even more apparent in the average collection period, which has more than doubled from 13 days in 1996 to 28 days in 2000.
Other studies on firm performance (Gibson (1995) , Kang and Stulz (2000) ) also make use of the seventh group of ratios -market ratios. These are price earning ratio and Q ratio, the market value of the firm to the replacement cost. However as mentioned before firms in my study are not publicly traded and therefore I lack information to calculate those ratios. Several studies use different efficiency measures than I do, e.g. sales to employment (Megginsion, Nash, and Randenborgh (1994) ). Due to many missing values, employment data are not exploited in the current analysis.
The differences of the mean test confirms the visual observations. The importance of bank credit has decreased both for the treatment group firms as well as for the control group firms. The growth rate of fixed assets has also decreased for all firms.
The change in the other variables over time is not significant. Based on this we cannot conclude that the bankruptcy of the bank has had an effect on client firms' financial ratios.
The differences of means analysis across treatment and control groups reveals the following. First, before 1998 firms in the treatment group were more leveraged. Hence, the treatment firms were more indebted. The difference in leverage disappears after 1998. Second, profitability was significantly lower for treatment firms before 1998.
After 1998 the mean of profitability of the two groups becomes insignificantly different due to the decrease of profitability in the control group. Third, liquidity has was smaller in both time periods for treatment firms. All other ratios of interest were not significantly different across the groups.
Based on comparison of the two groups we see that the treatment firms' financial characteristics are different from the control firms but we cannot detect any sign which would say that the performance of treatment firms deteriorated after their bank crash.
It seems that even the initial, somewhat worse financial condition of treatment firms does not worsen their performance measures compared to other firms.
Note, that if the firm was bankrupt we do not see it anymore in the sample and it is not taken it into account in calculating the means of financial ratios. So the differences of means analysis is biased since the comparison samples are conditional on the firm's existence. This may explain the weakness of finding support for the negative effect of bank failure. To correct the possible bias I apply the STLS estimation methodology in the following regression analysis.
Besides correcting the sample selection bias the regression analysis of key financial characteristics also takes into account the contemporaneous changes in other control variables. I perform the panel estimation using four performance measures. The determinants of firm profitability, growth rate of fixed assets, liquidity, and leverage are the basic firm characteristics consistent with finance theory. Based on the STLS analyses we do not find that the bank bankruptcy has had any negative effect on firms performance indicators. Also we can conclude that the correction for survivorship bias and control for other variables did not change the results found in the raw differences in differences analyses.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the effect of bank failure on client firms performance. The study is based on a bank bankruptcy in Estonia in 1998. Since bank financing is a significant source of external funds for firms in countries undergoing market reforms, the question of the impact of bank failure is an important field of study. This study relates to several research areas. The bank runs and banking crises literature has increased during the last two decades due to the increase in frequency of banking crises. Closely connected to this is the macroeconomic literature, that studies the different channels of financial disturbances to the real economy (Bernanke (1983) ).
Hence the bank-firm relationship is an important subject to study. More generally the financial development is considered as an important factor for promoting economic growth and hence the economic growth literature (Levine and Zervos (1998) , Rajan and Zingales (1998), Filer, Hanousek, and Campos (1999) ) is related to the present study.
The analysis of firm performance and financial structure in my paper are essential to the corporate finance literature (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) .34
